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Evidence and Testimony: Philip Henry Gosse 
and the Omphalos Theory 
by PETER CAWS 
Eccentricity has always abounded when and where strength of character has abounded; and the amount of 
eccentricity in a society has generally been proportional to the amount of genius, mental vigour, and moral courage it 
contained. 
John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, ch. III. 
I 
Eccentricity took many forms in Victorian England, but in keeping with the atmosphere of the times there were 
two especially noticeable varieties. There were religious eccentrics, like John Nelson Darby, a passionate 
nonconformist who solved the ancient problem as to the nature of the sin against the Holy Ghost by identifying it with 
the taking of Holy Orders; and there were scientific eccentrics, like Andrew Crosse, who in the course of electrical 
experiments at his country estate created a new species of beetle (Acarus crossii) and brought down on himself a 
torrent of totally undeserved abuse on the grounds that he was trying to be God. From time to time these tendencies 
were combined in a single individual, with invariably interesting results. Religion and science have never really been 
comfortable in one another’s presence, and the antics to which men are driven who try to make them so have not 
ceased yet. Contemporary attempts, however, seem anaemic in comparison with the fierce controversies of the 
nineteenth century. What now is done weakly, even pathetically, was then a matter for “genius, mental vigour, and 
moral courage”; and while the result might have been to make a man look ridiculous, it never made him look puerile. 
The subject of this essay seems often comic, sometimes tragic, but always a man of strong character and firm will. 
Philip Henry Gosse is best known, if at all, as the overbearing Father in Edmund Gosse’s autobiographical sketch 
Father and Son, although the sympathies of the reader of that book are likely to lie, as they were intended to lie, with 
the son. The story is the familiar one: a sickly child, brought up under the stern and repressive eye of a Victorian 
father, eventually throws off the burden and sets out to live his own life. He was, of course, quite right to do so, and I 
do not wish to suggest otherwise. My purpose is to draw attention to what Edmund Gosse himself calls “the unique 
and noble figure of the father”1—a distinguished naturalist, author of one of the most brilliant failures in the history 
of scientific theories, and in his own right a more colorful figure than the son as whose father he himself suspected he 
would one day be known. He was born in 1810, the son of an itinerant miniature painter, and died in 1888 a Fellow 
of the Royal Society and the author of more than thirty books and of innumerable scientific papers. It is perhaps best 
to begin with an account of his scientific development. 
At first glance there is nothing eccentric in the professional life of Philip Gosse. Brought up in a small seaport town 
where the principal form of recreation was exploring the shore or the surrounding country, and spending a great part 
of his early life in comparatively remote and wild places—first Newfoundland, then Canada, and finally Alabama—
it was not surprising that his innate powers of keen observation should have led him into a career as a naturalist. In 
Newfoundland, where he was employed as a clerk in a whaling office at Carbonear, he bought Kanmacher’s edition 
of Adams’s Essays on the Microscope, an act which he regarded, in his characteristically self-critical way, as a formal 
dedication to a life of science. By the time he left Newfoundland for an abortive attempt at farming in Ontario he had 
already begun an extensive collection of insects which occupied the foreground of his attention; his last memento of 
Newfoundland was a rare cockroach, and the sole comment in his diary when he first reached Canada was the 
following: “July 15.—As I this day arrived in Quebec, I procured some lettuce for my caterpillars, which they ate 
greedily.”2 This single-mindedness in matters of biology remained with him for the rest of his life; the birth of his 
only child appears in the diary with the entry: “E. delivered of a son. Received green swallow from Jamaica.”3 Of 
course such things might be interpreted, not unjustly, as indicating a certain stolidity of character, and there is plenty 
of other evidence to show that Gosse, as a young man, took things very seriously indeed, himself most seriously of 
all. 
The Canadian venture proving a failure, Gosse traveled to Philadelphia (observing en route the rudeness of the 
 
 
natives of Vermont) and there met a number of the leading American naturalists of the period, including members of 
the remarkable Peale family.4 From Philadelphia he proceeded, mainly by ship, to Mobile, and thence to King’s 
Landing and Dallas, Alabama, where for nine months he was a schoolmaster. The natives of Alabama were also rude, 
and they were still extremely anti-English (it was barely sixty years since the Revolution); and although Philip Gosse 
enjoyed many things about his stay in the South, including the “woffles” which were served for breakfast, the frequent 
violence, especially towards the Negroes, and the almost tangible moral strain of slavery, made him glad to leave and 
return to England after twelve years in the Americas.5 
It was not easy to find suitable work in England, and for the first year after his return Gosse lived in something 
close to penury. He spent some time, however, in working the notes of his Canadian period into a manuscript entitled 
The Canadian Naturalist, a series of imaginary conversations, somewhat stiff in tone, between a father and son, on 
the flora and fauna of the region in which he had stayed. At first he met with no success in finding a publisher, but 
finally, when he was at “the extremity of dejection and disgust,” he was sent for by Mr. John Van Voorst of Paternoster 
Row. Edmund Gosse describes the interview: 
The publisher began slowly: “I like your book; I shall be pleased to publish it; I will give you one 
hundred guineas for it.” One hundred guineas! It was Peru and half the Indies! The reaction was so 
violent that the demure and ministerial looking youth, closely buttoned up in his worn broadcloth, 
broke down utterly into hysterical sob upon sob, while Mr. Van Voorst, murmuring, “My dear young 
man! My dear young man!” hastened out to fetch wine and minister to wants which it was beyond 
the power of pride to conceal any longer.”6 
This was the beginning of a long association between author and publisher. The Canadian Naturalist showed what he 
could do in a literary direction, and as time went on he learned to do it brilliantly. He could be erudite and familiar at 
the same time, interspersing careful zoological and botanical observations with amusing anecdotes, providing his own 
illustrations in line or watercolor, and turning out, over the next thirty-five years, a dozen or more enormously 
successful books of popular natural history. He acquired a large and faithful public, which enthusiastically bought his 
books and took them to the seaside, despoiling in the process (much to his chagrin) the shore which was his favorite 
collecting-ground. Gosse’s relation to his readers is perfectly foreshadowed in the relation between the father and the 
son in The Canadian Naturalist. The father, in the opening chapter of that book, proposes a series of excursions into 
the neighbouring countryside: “Charles.—Few things would give me greater pleasure. I have often felt the want of a 
companion in my walks, who, by his superior judgement, information, and experience, might remove my doubts, 
gratify my curiosity, and direct my attention to those subjects which are instructive as well as amusing; for I anticipate 
both instruction and amusement from our inquiries, and enter into your proposal with delight.”7 The genteel sections 
of the Victorian middle classes were equally delighted, and were instructed and amused in the thousands not only by 
Gosse’s books but also by his invention of the aquarium, which brought the seashore into drawing-rooms all over the 
country. 
Scientific work of a more serious nature was not, however, neglected. Gosse crossed the Atlantic once more for a 
two-year study of the birds of Jamaica, which produced one of the important early works on the ornithology of the 
West Indies. His inflexible uprightness of character is illustrated by an incident in connection with the publication of 
a supplement to that work, the Illustrations of the Birds of Jamaica, a rare and exceedingly beautiful set of colored 
plates each bearing the inscription “P.H.G. del. et lith.” These were published by subscription, and in the course of 
printing it became apparent that the cost of production would exceed the total amount subscribed; but rather than 
change the price of the work once announced, Gosse absorbed the extra cost out of his own pocket, actually publishing 
the set at a loss. Subsequent studies, especially of small and microscopic forms of marine life, led to his election to 
the Royal Society in 1856. Darwin corresponded with him, asking for information in connection with his own 
painstaking work on variation, and he was honored by being taken into the confidence of the biological revolutionaries 
of the 1850’s: 
It was the notion of Lyell . . . that before the doctrine of natural selection was given to a world which 
would be sure to lift up at it a howl of execration, a certain body-guard of sound and experienced 
naturalists, expert in the description of species, should be privately made aware of its tenour. Among 
 
 
those who were thus initiated, or approached with a view towards possible illumination, was my 
Father. He was spoken to by Hooker, and later on by Darwin, after meetings of the Royal Society 
in the summer of 1857.8 
Gradually his interest became concentrated in a few highly specialized areas, particularly the Rotifera, and he wrote 
one classic of nineteenth-century zoology, the Actinologia Britannica, which remained the standard reference work 
for many years. He was an indefatigable observer, and cannot really be said to have retired at all; at the age of seventy-
five he was still busily occupied, publishing in 1885 a monograph on The Prehensile Armature of the Papillonidae. 
Gosse’s great merit as a scientist lay in a capacity, rarely encountered, for precision and minuteness in observation, 
which called for extraordinary resources of patience and eyesight, neither of which seems ever to have failed him in 
connection with his scientific work. In The Birds of Jamaica he enunciates a principle to which he always adhered 
and which is of supreme importance in the descriptive branches of science: 
Perhaps a word of apology may be thought needful for the minuteness with which the author has 
sometimes recorded dates, and other apparently trivial circumstances, in his observations. It is 
because of his conviction, that an observer is hardly competent to determine what circumstance is 
trivial, and what is important: many a recorded fact in science has lost half its value from the 
omission of some attendant circumstance, which the observer either did not notice or thought 
irrelevant. It is better to err on the side of minuteness than of vagueness.9 
When, at rare intervals, he allowed himself to wander from this close attention to the facts, the results were, from a 
scientific point of view, less happy. His speculations, largely on the question of the creation and extinction of species 
(although he also put forward the theory that some frequently reported sea serpents were really prehistoric monsters) 
were generally naive, while his taste, left to its own devices, ran in the direction of the Gothic novel. The subtitles of 
that most romantic work, The Romance of Natural History, show the scientist in an entirely different light. Chapter X, 
entitled “The Terrible” (other chapters are called “The Vast,” “The Wild,” “The Unknown”), deals with the following 
surprising collection of incidents: “Horrible Death of Thackwray—Hottentot’s Adventure with a Rhinoceros—Similar 
Adventure of Mr. Oswell—Terrific Peril of Captain Methuen—Nearly Fatal Combat with a Kangaroo—Horrid 
Voracity of Sharks—Coolness of an Indian Officer—Ugliness of Vipers—Shocking Adventure in Guiana—Another 
in Venezuela—Fatal Encounter with Bees in India.” The last of these episodes has, for this study, a special interest. It 
concerns two English gentlemen, Messrs. Armstrong and Boddington; the victim, inevitably, was “alas! Mr. 
Boddington,” who “unable any longer to resist the countless hordes of his infuriated winged foes, threw himself into 
the depths of the water, never to rise again.” Gosse is not actually sure that the assailants were bees, and covers his 
admission of ignorance with this remarkable statement: “Whatever the true nature of the insect, it affords an apt 
illustration of such passages of Holy Scripture as the following:—‘The Lord shall hiss for . . . the bee that is the land 
of Assyria,’ (Isa. vii. 18.) ‘The Lord thy God will send the hornet among them, until they that are left, and hide 
themselves from thee, be destroyed.’ (Deut. vii. 20.) ”10 
Overlooking for the moment the claim to aptness (from whom was Mr. Boddington hiding? and why Assyria?), 
here is a strange insertion into the work of a Fellow of the Royal Society. But by this time, after twenty years, anybody 
familiar with Gosse’s writings would have taken it in his stride. Wherever one looks one finds passing confessions of 
faith, references to the Bible, exhortations to the young, and while these might at first be taken for customary piety, 
the weight of the evidence, and the recondite nature of some of the allusions (such as those in the case of Mr. 
Boddington) soon suggest a different hypothesis. It is impossible to do justice to the life and work of Philip Gosse 
without paying close attention to this other side of his character. 
II 
When Philip Gosse returned to England from America in 1839, urgently in need of employment, he was offered a 
post in a provincial museum. He was hardly in a position to be particular about conditions of work, and the offer was 
really an act of charity on the part of an interested friend, but he turned it down. 
I should fear [he wrote] that I should be thrown into situations in which I might find it difficult to 
keep that purity of intention which I value more than life; and likewise, that my opportunities of 
being useful to my fellowmen, especially to their souls, would be much curtailed. I view this 
transient state as a dressing-room to a theatre; a brief, almost momentary visit, during which 
 
 
preparation is to be made for the real business and end of existence. Eternity is our theatre: time our 
dressing-room. So that I must make every arrangement with a view to its bearing on this one point.11 
Apparently he was entertaining, at this time, the idea of entering the ministry of one of the evangelical sects. But he 
could hardly be said to have been brought up in a religious atmosphere. For the origin of this pious tendency it is 
necessary to go back to Newfoundland, and to the time, almost exactly, of his purchase of Adams on the microscope—
a time at which he “became, suddenly and consciously, a naturalist and a Christian.”12 The stimulus for his conversion, 
if it can be called that, was an illness of his sister Elizabeth, far away in England, to whom he was closely attached. 
“My prominent thought in this crisis was legal. I wanted the Almighty to be my friend; to go to Him in my need. I 
know He required me to be holy. He had said, ‘My son, give Me thy heart.’ I closed with Him, not hypocritically, but 
sincerely; intending henceforth to live a new, a holy life; to please and serve God.”13 It was as if he had signed a 
contract with God; and it did not occur to him to doubt, since he knew himself to be strong enough in character to 
keep his part of the bargain, that God would in turn do what was expected of Him. 
This contract of faith he interpreted as requiring the acceptance, word for word, of the literal and symbolic truth of 
the Bible. The double sense is important. While the plain meaning of the text was to be zealously defended, there was 
more to be discovered beneath the surface. Gosse applied himself to the investigation of this hidden truth with an 
energy matched only by that which he devoted to his researches in natural history. At first these studies were carried 
on in comparative isolation, but after his return to England two circumstances mitigated this spiritual loneliness. He 
found, in the suburb of London where he was for a short time a schoolmaster, a group of Christians, followers of J. N. 
Darby, called by the outside world “Plymouth Brethren” but by themselves simply “the Brethren,” or, modestly, “the 
Saints.” Darby, as was remarked earlier, disapproved of the ministry, so that Gosse was no longer tempted in that 
direction; but he found among these people a kind of intellectual interest in salvation and prophecy perfectly in 
sympathy with his own convictions. He was, throughout his life, evangelical, but never in the passionate sense usually 
attached to the word. His concern for the souls of men sprang less from sympathy than from duty, and the duty was 
not necessarily pleasant—it was part of the agreement with God, a service demanded in exchange for the right to enter 
into the mysteries of the interpretation of Scripture. Independently of this connection he met, and later married, Emily 
Bowes, the daughter of a Bostonian couple, her principal attraction being an equally fervid, equally rigid, and equally 
eccentric form of Christianity with his own. Together they read the prophets and commentaries on the prophets, 
treading eagerly, in the words of Edmund Gosse, “the curious path which they had hewn for themselves through this 
jungle of symbols.”14 The death of his first wife after only nine years of marriage left him, if anything, more isolated 
than before (the Saints proving too tame and unimaginative for his fierce symbolic tastes), and drove his already rather 
stern and humorless character into a melancholia from which he never completely recovered. 
It was inevitable that such exclusive and fanatic attention to the details of biblical exegesis should before long 
produce a distorting effect on Gosse’s attitude to the contemporary world and, eventually, to science itself. The 
commentators were, if anything, more prophetic than the prophets, and led the inquisitive couple “to recognise in wild 
Oriental visions direct statements regarding Napoleon III and Pope Pius IX and the King of Piedmont, historic figures 
which they conceived as foreshadowed, in language which admitted of plain interpretation, under the names of 
denizens of Babylon and companions of the Wild Beast.”15 The Church of Rome in particular figured largely in the 
deciphering of the Book of Revelation, and it was denounced and hated with a special passion. “We welcomed any 
social disorder in any part of Italy, as likely to be annoying to the Papacy. If there was a customhouse officer stabbed 
in a fracas at Sassari, we gave loud thanks that liberty and light were breaking in upon Sardinia. . . .”18 The effects of 
all this were felt in the most unlikely quarters. There was, for instance, a man who used to pass down the street where 
the Gosses lived selling onions, with a cry of 
Here’s your rope 
To hang the Pope 
And a penn’orth of cheese to choke him. 
The cheese [writes Edmund Gosse] appeared to be legendary; he sold only onions. My Father did not eat onions, but 




Such peculiarities might have been merely amusing, had they confined themselves to international affairs. But 
scriptural theory found other applications closer to home, and Philip Gosse developed, out of a naturally strong moral 
sense and a tendency to introspection, a morbid sensitivity of conscience and a practice of hypercritical self-vigilance 
which he did not hesitate to extend to his family (principally Edmund) and to the congregation of which, after the 
death of his wife and his removal to Devonshire, he became informally the pastor. This side of his character is so well 
known from Father and Son that there is no need to dwell on it here. The introduction of religious conviction into 
daily life produced, however, another effect of more direct interest, namely a relation between the scientist and his 
field of study perhaps unique in the history of science among workers of comparable distinction. 
Nature was the work of God, and as such was to be taken seriously. It must, as the work of God, be perfect. 
Accordingly, for Gosse, the suggestion that anything in Nature might have been better arranged, or the slightest hint 
of levity in connection with it, were almost comparable to blasphemy, and he was ready to meet either with indignation 
on God’s behalf. In The Ocean, for example, he scornfully rejects a tentative version of the theory of development: 
“Goldsmith flippantly asserts, that the Shrimp and the Prawn ‘seem to be the first attempts which Nature made when 
she meditated the formation of the Lobster.’ Such expressions as these, however, are no less unphilosophical than they 
are derogatory to God’s honour; these animals being in an equal degree perfect in their kind, equally formed by 
consummate wisdom, incapable of improvement. . . .”18 But there was a danger in thus zealously guarding God’s 
rights in Nature—the danger that he might, as time went on, come to take a certain proprietary attitude towards it 
himself; and to this temptation he soon succumbed. He felt fully justified in doing so, and would have been surprised 
and indignant, as religious people tend to be, if anybody had pointed out to him that to presume on God’s favor was a 
form of spiritual pride. But there is no doubt that Philip Gosse was both proud and presumptuous, and in the 
Devonshire Coast there is a remarkable juxtaposition of passages which form such a clear basis for this indictment 
that I shall, at the risk of tedium, quote them extensively. He is discussing the aesthetic qualities of natural objects: 
But there is another point of view from which a Christian . . . looks at the excellent and the beautiful 
in Nature. He has a personal interest in it all; it is a part of his own inheritance. As a child roams 
over his father’s estate, and is ever finding some quiet nook, or clear pool, or foaming waterfall, 
some lofty avenue, some bank of sweet flowers, some picturesque or fruitful tree, some noble and 
widespread prospect,—how is the pleasure heightened by the thought ever recurring,—All this will 
be mine by and by! ... So with the Christian.... 
And thus I have a right to examine, with as great minuteness as I can bring to the pleasant task, 
consistently with other claims, what are called the works of nature. I have the very best right 
possible, the right that flows from the fact of their being all mine,—mine not indeed in possession, 
but in sure reversion. And if anyone despise the research as mean and little, I reply that I am scanning 
the plan of my inheritance. And when I find any tiny object rooted to the rock, or swimming in the 
sea, in which I trace with more than common measure the grace and delicacy of the Master Hand, I 
may not only give Him praise for his skill and wisdom, but thanks also, for that He hath taken the 
pains to contrive, to fashion, to adorn this, for me. 
And then there follows immediately this statement: 
THE CRYSTALLINE JOHNSTONELLA 
I have the pleasure of announcing a new animal of much elegance, which I believe to be of a 
hitherto unrecognised form. I shall describe it under the appellation of Johnstonella Catharina.... 
The elegant form, the crystal clearness, and the sprightly, graceful movements of this little 
swimmer in the deep sea, render it a not altogether unfit vehicle for the commemoration of an 
honoured name in marine zoology. . . . I venture respectfully to appropriate to this marine animal, 
the surname and Christian name of Mrs. Catharine Johnston, as a personal tribute of gratitude for 
the great aid which I have derived from her engravings in the study of zoophytology.19 
Of course it is, in a sense, unfair to put the matter in this way, and to suggest a patronizing flourish in this innocent 
piece of nomenclature; but there is some justice in it. Ever since that day when, in Newfoundland, he had come to 
terms with God, Philip Gosse had, consciously or not, felt himself in a position of privilege. Nothing illustrates this 
attitude more clearly than the nature of his prayers. 
 
 
Edmund Gosse has vividly described how his father, with clenched fists and cracking fingers, knelt nightly and 
wrestled with God, his supplications occasionally turning into outright demands. From other sources we can gather 
what the objects of those demands were. There were three things during his life that Philip Gosse wanted very badly 
indeed, and to which he expressly devoted a great deal of his spiritual energy in prayer; and in the end, to all 
appearances, God failed to live up to his commitments, for none of the three requests was granted. The first, and most 
persistent, was inspired by his reading, as a young man, Habershon’s Dissertation on the Prophetic Scriptures, in 
which the Second Coming of Christ was vividly anticipated; in his own words: “I immediately began a practice, which 
I have pursued uninterruptedly for forty-six years, of constantly praying that I may be one of the favoured saints who 
shall never taste of death, but be alive and remain until the coming of the Lord, to be ‘clothed upon with my house 
which is from heaven.’ ”20 This is not an infrequent prayer among evangelical Christians, who in general, however, 
seem content to die without a feeling of having been cheated. Not so Philip Gosse. Even in life his confidence was 
such that he lived in momentary expectation of this apotheosis, and would be chagrined when it did not occur: “He 
would calculate, by reference to prophecies in the Old and New Testament, the exact date of this event; the date would 
pass, without the expected Advent, and he would be more than disappointed,—he would be incensed. Then he would 
understand that he must have made some slight error in calculation, and the pleasures of anticipation would 
recommence.”21 But at death it was not a question of miscalculation. His second wife, Eliza Gosse (nee Brightwen), 
wrote in a short memoir that “this hope of being caught up before death continued to the last, and its non-fulfilment 
was an acute disappointment to him. It undoubtedly was connected with the deep dejection of his latest hours on 
earth.”22 
The second prayer concerned his son, Edmund, and was of especial importance to him as incorporating the last 
wish of his first wife. Philip and Emily Gosse had, from the beginning, dedicated their child, like Samuel, to the service 
of the Lord; and Emily, dying of cancer in 1857, reiterated that dedication in the most solemn and saintly manner 
possible, so that God himself, it seemed, must be bound to accept it and ensure its consummation. For many years all 
was well, and when Edmund was publicly baptized and admitted to the communion of the Brethren at the age of 
twelve Philip Gosse felt the sacred responsibility to be almost discharged. But in truth Edmund had hardly known 
what he was doing, or that any other life than that among the Brethren was conceivable, and when he went to London 
as a young man to work in the British Museum he discovered that his tastes and talents lay in other directions. 
Gradually severing his links with the Evangelical Movement, he entered upon a career as a man of letters. Philip Gosse 
wrote angrily to his son and prayed angrily to his Maker, but in vain. 
There remains one episode out of the three in Philip Gosse’s life of prayer. It was of shorter duration, but its 
implications were of vastly greater scope, and its historical interest is such that it will be dealt with in a section by 
itself. 
Ill 
Protestant Christianity, as Martineau somewhere remarks, is built upon the authority of the Bible, as Catholicism 
is built upon that of the Church. The vulnerability of the first position, as compared with the flexibility of the second, 
is obvious; for the Church can discreetly change its mind, while the Bible, as a historical document, is by definition 
incapable of adapting to novelty. Catholicism survived the nineteenth century much better, in its own sphere of 
influence, than Protestantism did, for this very reason; for in that century more than in any other the intellectual 
sympathies of the world were alienated from the Bible by the exposure of many apparently straightforward statements 
of fact in it as ignorant legends. The blow was not, of course, mortal. Ignorant people continued to believe the legends, 
and the intellectuals began to treat them as mythical adumbrations of profound truths. But those few really educated 
men to whom the Bible had been genuinely and directly authoritative experienced a most disturbing conflict of 
loyalties. Philip Gosse is a perfect example of the type. 
The greatest problem before 1858, when Darwin and Wallace brought out into the open the question of the origin 
of species, was geological. According to Archbishop Ussher’s reading of Genesis there could not, in 1857 (the year 
in which Gosse published his own work on the subject), be anything in the world more than 5,861 years old; according 
to rapidly accumulating stratigraphical and paleontological evidence there was scarcely anything of interest in the 
world whose history was not much longer than that by hundreds of thousands, even millions, of years. The stratigraphy 
 
 
might be accommodated, at a stretch, by introducing that famous gap of aeons between the first and second verses of 
Genesis 1, but this did not help the paleontology, especially that of species closely related to living ones, even identical 
with them. The “days” of creation might be extended to cover geological ages, but there were difficulties there about 
the order of appearance of fossils in the stratigraphical record, and besides, to the purists, this seemed already to be 
taking hardly permissible liberties with the manifest declarations of the Holy Spirit. These were grave perplexities for 
those “to whom,” in Gosse’s own words, 
the veracity of God is as dear as life. They cannot bear to see it impugned; they know that it cannot 
be overthrown; they are assured that He who gave the Word, and He who made the worlds, is One 
Jehovah, who cannot be inconsistent with Himself. But they cannot shut their eyes to the startling 
fact, that the records which seem legibly written on His created works do flatly contradict the 
statements which seem to be plainly expressed in His word. 
Here is a dilemma. A most painful one to the reverent mind! And many reverent minds have laboured long and 
hard to escape from it.23 
Most of them gave up the struggle, either closing their eyes to the evidence, or abandoning the literal interpretation of 
the Bible, or in many cases just learning to live with the dilemma as something too great for the limited intelligence 
of man. This last was at least a humble, if not a comfortable, position. But none of this would do for Philip Gosse; he 
would be content with nothing less than a complete solution of the riddle. The incredible thing is that he succeeded in 
finding one so perfect that it was, and remains, proof against all refutation. And although he called the book in which 
he presented it to the world “an attempt to untie the geological knot,” his method has all the audacity of Alexander at 
Gordium. 
It was this book, Omphalos,24 whose acceptance by the world of science formed the object of Gosse’s third petition 
to God. His own attitude towards it is made explicit in the preface: 
I would not be considered an opponent of geologists; but rather as a cosearcher with them after that 
which they value as highly as I do, TRUTH. The path which I have pursued has led me to a 
conclusion at variance with theirs. I have a right to expect that it be weighed; let it not be imputed 
to vanity if I hope that it may be accepted. 
But what I much more ardently desire is, that the thousands of thinking persons, who are scarcely 
satisfied with the extant reconciliations of Scriptural statements and Geological deductions,—who 
are silenced but not convinced,— may find, in the principle set forth in this volume, a stable resting-
place. I have written it in the constant prayer that the God of Truth will deign so to use it; and if He 
do, to Him be all the glory!25 
That God would deign to use it, given the irresistible force of the argument, seemed beyond all doubt. 
Never was a book cast upon the waters [writes Edmund Gosse] with greater anticipation of success 
than was this curious, this obstinate, this fanatical volume. My Father lived in a fever of suspense, 
waiting for the tremendous issue. . . . My Father, and my Father alone, possessed the secret of the 
enigma; he alone held the key which could smoothly open the lock of geological mystery. He offered 
it, with a glowing gesture, to atheists and Christians alike. This was to be the universal panacea; this 
the system of intellectual therapeutics which could not but heal all the maladies of the age. But, alas! 
atheists and Christians alike looked at it and laughed, and threw it away.26 
In this the Christians, at least, were ill-advised; but at all events the reception of the book meant that here too Gosse’s 
prayers had failed to find a response. Had he known at the time, as he did not, of the two other great disappointments 
that were in store for him, it might well have broken his spirit; as it was, coming soon after the death of his wife, the 
failure of Omphalos had a sufficiently disturbing effect. But it is time to examine the theory itself. Gillispie says that 
it was “far from original,” and Gosse himself admits that he got the germ of the idea, partly from an anonymous tract, 
and partly from Granville Penn’s The Mineral and Mosaic Geologies of 1822. Nevertheless its working out in 
Omphalos and the detail with which its application is followed through bear Gosse’s individual mark. 
The book is an account of an imaginary court inquiry, with witnesses. One curious thing about it is that, except at 
the very end, there is no appeal to the Bible; and as for Archbishop Ussher, he is not once mentioned. The whole tone 
of the book, in fact, is modern, and with one or two critical exceptions there is nothing in it which could not have been 
 
 
accepted by the most hardened atheistic geologist of the time. The case for the geological ages is presented fully, even 
sympathetically, as the testimony of “The Witness for the Macro-Chronology”; strata, fossils of plants and animals, 
erosion—all the available evidence is brought out. There are two examples chosen for special attention: the pterodactyl 
(illustrated by an unintentionally humorous woodcut of a bat with bulging eyes and gaping fangs) and the Jurassic tree 
Lepidodendron. But when all the data have been marshalled, Gosse puts his finger skilfully on the Achilles heel of the 
whole argument: “. . . there is nothing here but circumstantial evidence; there is no direct testimony. . . . You will say, 
‘It is the same thing; we have seen the skeleton of the one, and the crushed trunk of the other, and therefore we are as 
sure of their past existence as if we had been there at the time.’ No, it is not the same thing; it is not quite the same 
thing; NOT QUITE. ... It is only by a process of reasoning that you infer they lived at all.”27 Of course he is quite 
right; the inference of causes from effects commits a logical fallacy. Sciences which deal with the past, or with the 
unobservable of any kind, constantly commit it—they have no alternative. This fact is tacitly admitted, and then quite 
properly forgotten, as far as the daily work of the scientist is concerned. But when somebody like Gosse gleefully 
draws attention to it there is absolutely nothing that can be brought forward in its defense—the only recourse is a 
challenge to the critic to produce an alternative, and equally plausible, explanation of the effects as they appear. Such 
a challenge Gosse was quite prepared to meet. 
His own theory invokes two postulates, the creation of matter and the persistence of species. “I assume that at 
some period or other in past eternity there existed nothing but the Eternal God, and that He called the universe into 
being out of nothing. I demand also, in opposition to the development hypothesis, the perpetuity of specific characters, 
from the moment when the respective creatures were called into being, till they cease to be.”28 As a matter of fact the 
second postulate is superfluous—Gosse’s theory, while it certainly removes the necessity for a theory of development 
(or of variation and natural selection), is not incompatible with such a theory. And as for the first, although he refuses 
to discuss it, nobody was in a position to maintain that there was any better account available of the origin of the 
universe, assuming that it had an origin. At least the Christians could accept the point without difficulty. Now creation 
is generally taken to be a beginning of history, and thereby also of natural history—the first verse of Genesis makes 
the idea explicit. It certainly is a beginning in some sense, but Gosse’s reflections led him to see that it could not be 
so in the way in which, for example, birth is. Birth is the beginning of a phase, but it depends on an earlier phase, 
namely prenatal development, whereas creation must be an absolute beginning de novo, depending upon no 
antecedents whatever except the will of the Creator. Suppose a creator setting about the creation of some natural 
object, a fern, a butterfly, a cow; at what stage of its existence should he choose to call it into being? We might 
unthinkingly choose the mature form; but is there any reason why this should be preferred to an immature or embryonic 
form? Is any stage fundamentally more suitable than any other as a starting-point of natural history? Gosse concluded 
not—indeed that there is no such thing as a natural beginning of this necessarily ultimate sort, the court of nature 
being, in fact, circular. “It is evident that there is no one point in the history of any single creature, which is a legitimate 
beginning of existence. . . . The cow is as inevitable a sequence of the embryo, as the embryo is of the cow.”29 Such a 
beginning must, therefore, be supernatural. “Creation, the sovereign fiat of Almighty Power, gives us the commencing 
point, which we in vain seek in nature. But what is creation? It is the sudden bursting into a circle. ”30 And just as the 
life-cycle of the individual is closed upon itself, so the cycle of species, of life itself, of the planet and the solar and 
stellar systems, may in principle be ever repeating, from eternity to eternity, only to be commenced or terminated by 
an irruption from without. 
Gosse’s stroke of genius thus lay in separating the question of creation from the question of history altogether. The 
older view has its classical expression in Donne: “That then this Beginning was, is matter of faith, and so, infallible. 
When it was, is matter of reason, and therefore various and perplex’t.”31 Gosse brought it all into the province of faith 
by suggesting the possibility that natural objects might be created with a history, or at least with the appearance of 
one. And this suggestion, once made, ceased to be a suggestion and became an indispensable necessity: a natural 
object could not be a natural object without an apparent history. A tree would not be a tree without rings, which 
indicate its age, and even a newly created tree must have rings. A man would not be a man without a navel, Sir Thomas 
Browne to the contrary notwithstanding. 
The whole organisation of the creature thus newly called into existence, looks back to the course of 
 
 
an endless circle in the past. Its whole structure displays a series of developments, which as distinctly 
witness to former conditions as do those which are presented in the cow, the butterfly, and the fern, 
of the present day. But what former conditions? The conditions thus witnessed unto, as being 
necessarily implied in the present organisation, were non-existent; the history was a perfect blank 
till the moment of creation. The past conditions or stages of existence in question, can indeed be as 
triumphantly inferred by legitimate deduction from the present, as can those of our cow or butterfly; 
they rest on the very same evidences; they are identically the same in every respect, except in this 
one, that they were unreal. They exist only in their results; they are effects which never had causes.  
Perhaps it may help to clear my argument if I divide the past developments of organic life, which 
are necessarily, or at least legitimately, inferrible from present phenomena, into two categories, 
separated by the violent act of creation. Those unreal developments whose apparent results are seen 
in the organism at the moment of its creation, I will call prochronic, because time was not an element 
in them; while those which have subsisted since creation, and have had actual existence, I will 
distinguish as diachronic, as occurring during time. 
Now, again I repeat, there is no imaginable difference to sense between the prochronic and 
diachronic development... .32 
Natural history thus appears as an unbroken progression, from some unimaginable beginning in the mind of God to 
the state of the world at present; somewhere in between an extrinsic act of creation occurred, and as prochronic events 
ceased, diachronic ones—identical in every essential point—began. When did this take place? Is there any way of 
deducing it from the evidence? Obviously not: “The commencement, as a fact, I must learn from testimony; I have no 
means whatever of inferring it from phenomena.”33 Fortunately the testimony is available. God need not have told us 
when the Creation occurred, but as a matter of fact he has done so, in Genesis, and it would be ungrateful—not to say 
foolish or even impious—in men of science to overlook the fact. So far they have “not allowed for the Law of 
Prochronism in Creation,”34 but without it all calculation is useless; “the amount of error thus produced we have no 
means of knowing; much less of eliminating it.”35 Accordingly every scrap of evidence for the Macro-Chronology 
contains a fatal flaw; and, as Gosse triumphantly concludes: “The field is left clear and undisputed for the one Witness 
on the opposite side, whose testimony is as follows:— 
“ ‘IN SIX DAYS JEHOVAH MADE HEAVEN AND EARTH, THE SEA, AND ALL THAT IN THEM IS.’ ”36 
But what, after all, did this victory amount to? To begin with, it showed that there had never really been a struggle: 
“I do not know that a single conclusion, now accepted, would need to be given up, except that of actual chronology. 
And even in respect of this, it would be rather a modification than a relinquishment of what is at present held; we 
might still speak of the inconceivably long duration of the processes in question, provided we understand ideal instead 
of actual time;—that the duration was projected in the mind of God, and not really existent.”37 Reduced to this, the 
conclusion is merely metaphysical, that is to say empirically empty; to assert that the world was created is rather like 
asserting that overnight everything in it has doubled in size, including rulers and retinae—nobody can tell the 
difference. One might as well retort that really everything has halved in size, or that everything has been uncreated, 
the former existence being real and the present ideal, for all that any experiment can possibly indicate to the contrary. 
Put in another way, Gosse’s claim comes to the same thing as maintaining that, before creation, Berkeley’s 
philosophical position was the correct one, while after it Locke’s was. Unfortunately most men persisted in seeing 
more in it than that, continuing to believe that there was a genuine difference of opinion between the geologists and 
the Holy Ghost, that it was impossible to agree with both but that it mattered which one agreed with. Gosse was 
undoubtedly right—it did not matter, at least not in the way that most men supposed, since (apart from the extra-
scientific point of faith) one could agree with both; but few could follow his intellectual maneuvers, perfectly rational 
though they were. 
And then any victory, even the most conclusive, becomes hollow when nobody takes the slightest notice of it, or 
when the few who do misinterpret it completely. Having instructed the printers to prepare an unusually large edition 
of his book against what he was certain would be a universal demand, Gosse found himself in possession of most of 
it, while the few copies that went out produced a critical reaction of a totally unexpected sort. The theory of Omphalos, 
after suitable distortion—not only by the malicious— became monstrous, asserting nothing less than that God had 
 
 
placed fossils in the rocks for the express purpose of deceiving scientists into thinking that the earth was older than it 
really was. Perhaps the crudest blows were struck by that perpetually well-meaning, infallibly clumsy Victorian, 
Charles Kingsley. 
We have reason to be grateful for Kingsley’s blunt insensitivity, which produced, like the irritating specks of sand 
in oysters, responses of great beauty in diverse quarters—the two most famous cases are, of course, Newman’s 
Apologia pro Vita sua and Huxley’s celebrated letter on the death of his son. There is no record of a similar reaction 
on Gosse’s part, but the stimulus was certainly no less painful. The theory itself, it is true, was perfectly acceptable to 
Kingsley: “Your distinction between diachronism and prochronism [he wrote to Gosse], instead of being nonsense, as 
it is in the eyes of the Locke-beridden Nominalist public, is to me, as a Platonist and realist, an indubitable and 
venerable truth.”38 But Gosse’s use of the theory to justify the geologists in the form, if not the substance, of their 
conclusions, while at the same time preserving the literal truth of Scripture, was too much for him. “Your book tends 
to prove this—that if we accept the fact of absolute creation, God becomes a Deus quidam deceptor. . . . You make 
God tell a lie. It is not my reason, but my conscience which revolts here.”39 Such obtuseness was bad enough—for 
Gosse’s whole point had been to show that God had not lied at all, that indeed he had been scrupulously honest (as 
Gosse himself would have been in similar circumstances), correcting in one mode of communication, namely Biblical 
revelation, a possible misconception which might arise in the interpretation of a message in another mode, namely 
geological evidence—but there was worse to come. Kingsley, self-confident as ever, went on: 
I cannot give up the painful and slow conclusion of five and twenty years’ study of geology, and 
believe that God has written on the rocks one enormous and superfluous lie for all mankind. 
To this painful dilemma you have brought me, and will, I fear, bring hundreds. It will not make 
me throw away my Bible. I trust and hope. I know in whom I have believed, and can trust Him to 
bring my faith safe through this puzzle, as He has through others; but for the young I do fear. I would 
not for a thousand pounds put your book into my children’s hands. ... Your demand on implicit faith 
is just as great as that required for transubstantiation, and, believe me, many of your arguments, 
especially in the opening chapter, are strangely like those of the old Jesuits, and those one used to 
hear from John Henry Newman fifteen years ago, when he, copying the Jesuits, was trying to 
undermine the grounds of all rational belief and human science, in order that, having made his 
victims (among whom were some of my dearest friends) believe nothing, he might get them by a 
“Nemesis of faith” to believe anything, and rush blindfold into superstition. Poor wretch, he was 
caught in his own snare... .40 
Bitter words for a supporter of the onion man! and especially bitter the remark about children, for whose mental and 
moral improvement Gosse, in his popular writings, had been so solicitous. But then Kingsley and Gosse were 
fundamentally at cross purposes in this matter. Kingsley’s aversion for Rome was intellectual, Gosse’s emotional; 
Gosse’s interest in religion and science was intellectual, Kingsley’s sentimental. The comparison of Gosse and 
Newman, ghastly and inconceivable as it would have seemed to them both, was not in fact entirely unjust, for Newman, 
in the Apologia, says: “From the age of fifteen, dogma has been the fundamental principle of my religion: I know no 
other religion; I cannot enter into the idea of any other sort of religion; religion, as a mere sentiment, is to me a dream 
and a mockery”41—in which substituting for “dogma” “the infallibility of the Scriptures” renders Gosse’s belief 
exactly. Both Newman and Gosse had seen that the defense of truth on the highest level leads sometimes to an 
appearance of deception on a lower, and both had been reprimanded for it by Kingsley, to whom truth was a simple, 
straightforward, rather typically English sort of thing. 
Newman, however, was the better off; for the Church provides an environment friendly to such subtleties, let 
infidels protest as they may; but what is a lonely Protestant to do, when God refuses to look after his own interests, 
and allows his shortsighted and enthusiastic servants to spoil the work of those who are more perceptive and austere? 
Nothing could shake Gosse’s faith in the Bible, but its author, engaged as he was in guiding the Kingsleys of the world 
safely through their puzzles, might perhaps be guilty of negligence. In his reaction to the failure of Omphalos Gosse 
almost suspected as much. “I think there was added to his chagrin with all his fellow mortals a first tincture of that 
heresy which was to attack him later on. It was now that, I fancy, he began, in his depression, to be angry with God.”42 
But this was not the petulant anger of a disappointed scholar. It is exactly here that Gosse’s enormous intellectual 
strength shows to its best advantage— the strength, in fact, not only of his intellect but also of his will. He knew he 
 
 
was right, even if God did not. And he was not broken; four years later he is at it again, in a second series of The 
Romance of Natural History, incorporating more and more of the contemporary advances of science into his own 
scheme, never yielding an inch in his fidelity to the inspired word. Kingsley had also accused him of the apostasy of 
evolution: “I don’t see how yours [i.e., Gosse’s prochronism] differs from the transmutation of species theory, which 
your argument, if filled out fairly, would, I think, be.”43 Indeed there was a superficial similarity, but Gosse was careful 
to make the distinction for those who cared to look for it. Species may, without violating the sanctity of Scripture, 
succeed one another; they may not evolve from one another. 
We know that the rate of mortality among individuals of a species, speaking generally, is equalled 
by the rate of birth, and we may suppose this balance of life to be paralleled when the unit is a 
species, and not an individual. If the Word of God contained anything either in statement or principle 
contrary to such a supposition, I would not entertain it for a moment, but I do not know that it does. 
I do not know that it is anywhere implied that God created no more after the six days’ work was 
done. His Sabbath-rest having been broken by the incoming of sin, we know from John v. 17, that 
He continued to work without interruption; and we may fairly conclude that progressive creation 
was included as a part of that unceasing work.44 
Gosse’s devotion and ingenuity in the service of science and religion were unlimited; and in the end even the total 
indifference of both parties was not enough to stop his heroic rearguard action in defense of their divinely appointed 
unity. 
IV 
Edmund Gosse’s charge against his father is that of inhumanity. “He regarded man rather as a blot upon the face 
of nature, than as its highest and most dignified development. . . . Among the five thousand illustrations which he 
painted, I do not think there is one to be found in which an attempt is made to depict the human form. Man was the 
animal he studied less than any other, understood most imperfectly, and, on the whole, was least interested in.”45 There 
is, in fact, at least one illustration containing human figures, but it only serves to reinforce the charge: the preface to 
The Ocean is accompanied by a woodcut of “The Whale Fishery,” showing two men being tossed out of a boat into 
the jaws of a gigantic cetacean. As to the other assertions, Edmund may have been right—certainly his own experience 
led to no other conclusion. And yet it is perhaps too easy a judgment. One of the tragedies of an over-intellectual faith 
is that it may conceal, effectively and permanently, more natural feelings. Abraham, with his sons in his bosom, is a 
model of paternal affection, but it is a grim reflection that, had there been no ram in the thicket, nothing would have 
prevented him from murdering Isaac. Kierkegaard makes of Abraham a hero of faith, and the heroes of faith are 
generally those for whom, in the end, everything works out right, either in martyrdom or in earthly felicity. For Gosse, 
in a sense, nothing worked out right, yet his life, although it ended in dejection, did not end in defeat. As in Mr. Van 
Voorst’s office, years before, his self-possession could be overcome only in extremis. He was, to use another favorite 
term of Kierkegaard’s—a term of the highest approbation—an individual; and if his behavior as an individual was 
eccentric (as it undoubtedly was) that very fact made it, in spite of his frequently expressed wish to give all the credit 
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